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A B S T R A C T   
Micronutrient deficiency is a pertinent global challenge that affects billions of people and has deleterious health 
effects. Large-scale food fortification (LSFF) is a cost- effective way to tackle micronutrient deficiency and 
improve health outcomes, particularly in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). However, the success of 
LSFF in LMICs is often hampered by limited compliance with fortification mandates by the private sector, who 
supply fortified foods. In this paper, we use a case study of the edible oil produced in Bangladesh to analyze the 
factors facilitating and impeding this compliance by for-profit actors. We identified four bottlenecks that dis-
incentivize private sector actors’ decision to comply. First, fortified and non-fortified products co-exist in the 
market, disincentivizing producers to invest in fortification. Second, the lack of traceability reduces the risk for 
large-scale producers’ non-compliance with the regulation. Third, small-scale producers face economic pressures 
that prevent them from adequately fortifying oil products. Lastly, law enforcement is currently inconsistent, 
allowing the supply of under-fortified oil in the market. Given the evidence, we recommend to strengthen the 
control of bulk item fortification through more frequent and rigorous surveillance at the production level. This 
will ensure that resource constrained consumers who also have the greatest potential to benefit from added 
nutrients, remain able to access affordable and nutrient-enriched food.   
1. Introduction 
Micronutrient deficiency is a pertinent global challenge: at least 2 
billion people are estimated to be deficient in at least one of the essential 
micronutrients needed for growth, development, and survival (Bailey 
et al., 2015). Among key micronutrients, vitamin A deficiency is wide-
spread and can increase the risk of morbidity and mortality (Bailey et al., 
2015). In Bangladesh, for instance, one in every five children of school 
age was estimated to be vitamin A deficient according to the 2011/2012 
National Micronutrient Survey (icddr’b et al., 2013). In tackling 
micronutrient deficiency, large-scale food fortification (LSFF hereafter) 
is seen as a cost-effective means to improve nutritional and functional 
outcomes (Method and Tulchinsky, 2015). A recent systematic review 
estimates that LSFF with vitamin A could protect around 3 million 
children in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs hereafter) per year 
from vitamin A deficiency (Keats et al., 2019). Fortifying widely 
consumed food items – e.g., staples and condiments – can significantly 
increase micronutrient intake by poor and marginalized people who lack 
access to these critical nutrients (Raghavan et al., 2019). 
However, LSFF in LMICs is often implemented and delivered sub- 
optimally, thereby limiting its potential for impact. For instance, 
Aaron et al. (2017) shows that compliance to fortification of chosen food 
items was less than half for 13 out of 18 LSFF programs across LMICs. 
Strikingly, the coverage of LSFF was lower among poorer and margin-
alized segments of the population (Aaron et al., 2017). Often, food ve-
hicles selected for LSFF are widely consumed by the entire population 
(Mkambula et al., 2020). However, the fortification of these food items 
is constrained by challenges faced by value chain actors who are key 
players in LSFF in LMICs. Across LMICs, the private sector, alongside 
consumers, bear the majority of the cost of LSFF programs as govern-
ments and donors contribute 10% of all funds needed to make LSFF 
sustainable (Darnton-Hill et al., 2017). The large body of literature on 
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the effectiveness of LSFF in LMICs indicates that for-profit private sector 
actors report several key economic barriers to complying with fortifi-
cation regulations including high cost of premix (the powdery blend of 
vitamins and minerals used in fortification), competition with non- 
fortifying producers, and unclear regulatory requirements (Luthringer 
et al., 2015). 
While private sector actors have the potential to contribute to 
nutritional outcomes, the conditions required for them to play a sub-
stantial role in providing nutrient-rich food to poor and marginalized 
people in LMICs are not well understood (Gillespie et al., 2013). To 
improve our understanding with respect to this gap, this article uses the 
experience of LSFF of edible oil in Bangladesh as an exploratory case 
study. We aim to generate new insights into the factors influencing the 
private sector’s contribution to nutritional outcomes, by seeking to un-
derstand the drivers of private sector non-compliance that have limited 
the success of Bangladesh’s edible oil fortification program. 
In Bangladesh, edible oil was selected as a food vehicle for LSFF as it 
is widely consumed by the population (Kar, 2018). The Government 
initiated its effort to fortify edible oil with vitamin A in November 2013 
(Vitamin A Enrichment in Edible Oil Act (Act No. 65 of 2013)) and 
officially mandated it under the “Oil Fortification Rules 2015” in 
November 2015 (The Fortification of Edible Oil with Vitamin ’A’ Rules, 
2015). The law stipulates the fortification of all edible oils with vitamin 
A and the levels of vitamin A that should be ensured and applied to 
locally produced, refined or imported products (Jungjohann et al., 
2021). However, only 29% of evaluated edible oil products was fortified 
above the minimum standard (i.e., 15 mg/liter) (GAIN and icddr’b, 
2017). Non– and under-compliance was found significantly more 
prominent in bulk, i.e., untraceable, oil products (7% compliance) than 
bottled oil (69% compliance) (GAIN and icddr’b, 2017). 
In response to these findings, the Government of Bangladesh is 
currently considering stronger legislation regarding bulk oil trans-
portation in drum and appropriate labelling to ensure traceability to 
strengthen surveillance (Government of Bangladesh, 2020). Banning 
bulk food items due to concerns of supplying under- or non-fortified food 
is one measure which has been considered in Indonesia (Jus’at and 
Soekirman, 2019) and tried out in Pakistan with limited success (Ran-
dall and Anjum, 2014). In addition, banning bulk oil trade might 
significantly affect access to edible oil by poor and marginalized pop-
ulations. Against this backdrop, our study identifies ways to improve 
private sector compliance with fortification regulations without jeop-
ardizing the access to fortified commodities based on an in-depth 
qualitative study in Bangladesh. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss 
the context of edible oil industry in Bangladesh and review literature 
that discusses the challenges faced by for-profit value chain actors in 
contributing to successful LSFF programs in LMICs. In Section 3, we 
explain our data collection strategies and methods of analysis before 
presenting our results in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss our results to 
recommend ways to improve food fortification in LMICs before 
concluding in Section 6. 
2. Backgrounds 
2.1. The edible oil industry in Bangladesh 
We divide the edible oil industry in Bangladesh in two value chains 
(Fig. 1): 1) bulk edible oil, consisting of soybean, palm and super palm 
oil and representing approximately 65% of the market share in the 
country and 2) bottled edible oil which take up the remaining 35% 
(GAIN and icddr’b, 2017)1. Bottled oil includes 39% soybean oil, 20% 
rice bran oil, 19% sunflower oil, 18% palm oil, 3% vegetable oil, 1% 
canola oil and 1% super palm oil. This study focuses on bulk and bottled 
palm oil, soybean oil and super palm oil as the major sources of edible oil 
refined and processed in Bangladesh. 
80 to 90% of edible oil consumed in Bangladesh is refined and pro-
cessed domestically after crude oil is imported (OPM et al, 2020a)2. The 
edible oil sector is concentrated at refinery level with a total of 25 re-
finery groups, all of whom are large-scale producers. These refineries 
manufacture and sell both bulk and bottled oil. However, there are a 
larger number of oil packers, including a total of 38 registered packers 
and more than 50 unregistered packers (estimated). These small- and 
medium-scale producers procure refined bulk oil from refineries, which 
they bottle and distribute3. 
Currently, only 69% of bottled oil and 7% of bulk oil is fortified 
above the minimum standard4 set by the Government of Bangladesh 
(GAIN and icddr’b, 2017). While refineries are responsible for fortifi-
cation of both bulk and bottled oil, fortification of bulk oil is unsatis-
factory (GAIN and icddr’b, 2017). As a result, regulations require 
packers as well as refineries to fortify edible oil with vitamin A premix. 
Two types of premix were reported to be available in Bangladesh: a 
Grade A quality premix, produced by BASF and sold at Bangladeshi Taka 
(BDT hereafter) 15,000/kg, and a Grade B quality premix, sold at BDT 
6000/kg5. Wholesalers and retailers are not responsible for fortifying oil 
or checking the fortification of oil they handle. 
Bulk oil is transported directly from refineries to national-level 
wholesalers in oil drums provided by wholesalers with little to no 
traceability. Bulk oil is purchased by institutional customers such as 
bakeries and restaurants and in loose form by individual consumers. 
Retailers acquire bulk oil from regional wholesale markets in cities such 
as Dhaka and Chittagong and bottled oil from sales representatives of 
different brands. Bottled oil is clearly labeled with the name of brands (i. 
e., associated with refineries or packers). Generally, retailers stock both 
bottled and bulk oil even in urban middle-income markets where the 
demand for bottled oil is higher than in other income groups. On 
average, bottled oil is significantly more expensive at 143 BDT than bulk 
oil at 85 BDT (GAIN and icddr’b, 2017). 
2.2. Literature review: Factors influencing fortification performance 
According to Luthringer et al. (2015), private sector actors report 
their greatest barrier to compliance with LSFF as being the cost of and 
access to premix. In Bangladesh, although the Ministry of Industries 
(MoInd hereafter) had initially procured vitamin A premix for oil re-
fineries, this support has ceased when edible oil fortification became 
mandated in 2017 (MDF Training and Consultancy BV, 2017). When 
premix is imported from abroad, it is subject to import duties, value- 
added tax (VAT), and currency exchange rates (Garrett et al., 2016; 
Lalani et al., 2019), resulting in increasing and fluctuating price. For 
large-scale enterprises, the cost of premix is merely 0.1–0.2% of the total 
cost (Chaudhry, 2018) and they are able to compensate for this cost 
increase through gaining efficiency in other activities (Lalani et al., 
2019). On the contrary, this proves challenging for small- and medium- 
scale enterprises who require small quantity of premix and undertake a 
limited number of activities through which they could absorb the 
increased cost of fortification (Garrett et al., 2016). In addition to 
1 Artisanal production of edible oil in Bangladesh such as mustard oil only 
accounts for less than 10% of vegetable oil available in Bangladesh. 
2 The majority of imported refined oil consists of sunflower oil, which was not 
included in this study.  
3 Packers and refineries do not have contractual arrangements that specify 
the quantity of oil purchase, timing, etc.  
4 An informant indicated that, unlike Grade A premix, Grade B premix may 
deteriorate after a period of exposure to sunlight as it lacks antioxidant. 
However, we were unable to confirm this independently.  
5 An informant indicated that, unlike Grade A premix, Grade B premix may 
deteriorate after a period of exposure to sunlight as it lacks antioxidant. 
However, we were unable to confirm this independently. 
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premix, there is a cost associated with adapting to and introducing new 
processing procedures for fortification (e.g., Quality Assurance (QA) and 
Quality Control (QC) process) and adapting to a new fortification law 
and quality standards (Maestre et al., 2017). Lack of technical capacity 
to fortify and monitor the fortification level is another important 
constraint (Luthringer et al., 2015; Mark et al., 2019), particularly for 
small- and medium-scale enterprises. 
As fortified and non-fortified oil products in Bangladesh are not well 
differentiated through labeling and certification (GAIN and icddr’b, 
2017), competing non-fortified products in the market disincentivizes 
producers from investing in premix, fortification equipment and moni-
toring (Luthringer et al., 2015). While the demand for non-compliant 
products can be reduced through awareness raising among consumers, 
the credence nature of fortified products (Laviolette, 2018) makes it 
challenging as, without labeling, fortified and non-fortified products are 
often identical in their appearance, smell, and taste. Additionally, the 
positive effects of these micronutrients are not evident in the short term 
nor easily attributable to the food consumed over time. This is evident in 
the case of iodized salt in Bangladesh where the consumption of under- 
fortified salt persists despite decades of consumer awareness campaigns 
(OPM et al., 2020b). Moreover, better signaling of fortified products, 
such as through the development of certification schemes, has cost im-
plications that could affect affordability. 
In the context of the aforementioned market disincentives, govern-
ment regulations and their enforcement crucially influence for-profit 
actors’ behaviors (Abdoulaye and Manus, 2018; Ebata et al., 2020). 
Where enforcement of requirements is weak, under-fortification, 
misleading labels or counterfeit products create unequal competition 
and provoke consumer suspicions. Many government agencies are 
under-funded and lack technical capacity and knowledge to appropri-
ately enforce fortification regulations (Luthringer et al., 2015). Because 
LSFF programs require regulatory agencies to collect samples for labo-
ratory testing and carry out quality and safety evaluations based on 
high-quality laboratories and effective surveillance mechanisms (Ben-
nett et al., 1994; Hongoro and Kumaranayake, 2000; Raghavan et al., 
2019), it is particularly challenging to monitor a large number of small- 
scale actors that are geographically sparse (Chadare et al., 2019). 
Another challenge facing fortification programs is that regulatory 
responsibility is at times unclear amongst government agencies that are 
involved in ensuring adequate fortification (GAIN and PHC, 2018). This 
is partly because nutrition issues span different ministries in a govern-
ment. Lack of coordination among government entities can lead to 
fragmented regulations for monitoring, quality control and inspection 
(Darnton-Hill et al., 2017). With unclear roles and responsibility 
assignment, confidence in the regulation is undermined and existing 
fortification regulations may be weakly or not at all enforced. 
Corruption by enforcement agencies and political resistance from 
industry actors is another critical constraint to effective regulatory 
enforcement (Darnton-Hill et al., 2017; Luthringer et al., 2015). Indeed, 
the introduction of oil fortification law in Bangladesh was met with 
resistance by refineries as they anticipated increased regulatory over-
sight and control by the government (Kar, 2018). Regulators perceive 
political risk of enforcement and thereby are incentivized to be lenient in 
monitoring and reporting the violation of regulations (Luthringer et al., 
2015). As a result, penalties might be kept too low to incentivize in-
dustry actors to consistently fortify and/or there might be inconsistent 
enforcement of the existing fortification standards (Luthringer et al., 
2015). 
In summary, the success of LSFF in LMICs will depend on the in-
centives shaping the behavior of private sector actors. These in turn are 
affected by market factors, such as competition between products, and 
the cost of production, as well as the regulatory and policy environment. 
In order to understand the relevance of these drivers of private sector 
compliance and how they interact to shape LSFF outcomes, we address 
the following research questions in the context of Bangladesh: 
What demand and supply-side factors influence key decisions by 
actors in the edible oil value chains that affect fortification 
outcomes? 
How do these factors enable or undermine the uptake of fortified 
foods, particularly among low-income groups? 
Fig. 1. Edible oil value chains in Bangladesh.  
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3. Methods 
3.1. Data collection strategies 
We employed qualitative research methods to collect data regarding 
value chain dynamics in the edible oil sector in Bangladesh. Primary 
data was collected via semi-structured interviews and focus group dis-
cussions (FGDs) with value chain actors, consumers of edible oil, and 
key informants outside the value chains that have relevant expertise or 
knowledge about factors affecting fortification decisions. In total, we 
interviewed 4 refineries, 6 packers, 6 wholesalers, 7 retailers, one 
representative from the packers’ association, one premix supplier, and 5 
key informants (Nutrition International, Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) 
Business Network, GAIN Bangladesh, MoInd, and Bangladesh Small and 
Cottage industries Corporation (BSCIC)) and conducted 5 FGDs with 
consumers (Table 1). 
Stratified purposeful sampling (Patton, 2002) was used to identify 
value chain actors for interview, seeking to consult those that were 
considered ‘typical’ of their position in the value chain, while also 
seeking variation particularly in terms of business size and geography. 
As there was difficulty in reaching some market actors, notably oil re-
fineries, there was also a degree of opportunistic sampling, taking 
advantage of circumstances that enabled access, including personal 
connections and snowballing approach. While this approach may have 
resulted in some participation bias, it allowed us to obtain insights from 
across the value chain, and from a wider range of respondents6. More-
over, although the number of refineries interviewed (4) is small, it 
represents a reasonable proportion of the total population (25 enterprise 
groups according to MoInd). 
FGD participants were selected so that a diversity of opinions was 
captured across income levels and geographical areas. In addition, there 
was an effort to ensure that FGDs were gender balanced to capture any 
gendered patterns in consumer awareness and behavior. However, 
women were under-represented in FGDs in Chittagong and Dhaka, due 
to cultural barriers. While gender-specific factors may not be adequately 
captured, we did not find important gendered differences in the other 
FGDs. 
As fortified oil consumption, distribution and production differed 
across country (OPM et al, 2020a), we purposively selected stakeholders 
in different parts of Bangladesh (Table 1). 
We collected data in Natore, Rangpur, Narayanganj, Dhaka, Gazipur, 
Chittagong and Sylhet. These districts were selected based on the loca-
tions of oil facilities, as well as the socio-economic characteristics of the 
consumers in different parts of Bangladesh. For example, we selected 
Natore and Rangpur districts in the north because consumers tend to be 
poorer compared to the rest of the country. 
We were unable to record interviews due to existing tensions related 
to policy reforms. In order to retain detailed information from the in-
terviews, the field team extracted relevant information in a pre-defined 
template soon after the interviews. Studies such as Rutakumwa et al. 
(2019) endorse such an approach for interviews conducted in sensitive 
social settings. In adherence to the ethical standards and requirements of 
this research7, the responses that each of these study participants pro-
vided are anonymized, and/or aggregate findings are presented. 
3.2. Data analysis 
Our analysis is based on three sources of information: (1) desk-based 
data collection regarding the structure of the value chains; (2) primary 
data collected through key informant interviews, stakeholder interviews 
and FGDs; and (3) theoretical and empirical evidence from the litera-
ture. We coded interview notes according to the conceptual framework 
by Maestre et al. (2017) and compared information from all three 
sources to triangulate it. 
Based on Maestre et al. (2017), we analyzed five demand-side re-
quirements – 1) nutrition awareness, 2) signaling, 3) availability, 4) 
affordability, and 5) acceptability – and five supply-side requirements – 
1) value creation and capture, 2) fair distribution of incentives, 3) value 
chain coordination and governance, 4) risk and uncertainty manage-
ment, and 5) appropriate institutional environment – for value chains to 
provide nutritious food for vulnerable people. We apply the framework 
in order to identify demand- and supply-side factors that influence 
edible oil producers and shape fortification outcomes. While Maestre 
et al. (2017) is not exclusively focused on fortified foods, to the best of 
our knowledge, this is the only existing framework that helps us analyze 
the opportunities and challenges faced by private sector actors post-farm 
gate in delivering nutritious foods, unlike those focused on the farm- 
level production of such foods (Girard et al., 2012; Masset et al., 
2012). Therefore, we adopted this framework for our analysis. 
4. Results 
4.1. Demand-side factors 
4.1.1. Availability and affordability 
As found by GAIN and icddr’b (2017), our data show that both bulk 
and bottled oil products were widely available in all areas where we 
conducted fieldwork. Across the study sites, the difference between the 
cheapest bottled oil option and cheapest bulk oil option was between 3 
and 35 BDT (Table 2). Low-income consumers and some of the middle- 
income consumers in Rangpur and Muhammadpur expressed preference 
for bulk oil over bottled oil because of the price difference. Generally, 
high-income consumers buy more bottled oil. FGDs in Chittagong indi-
cate that all of the low-income consumers purchased bulk oil while all 
middle-income consumers purchased bottled oil. 
However, affordability is not the only deciding factor behind con-
sumer choices. Even low-income consumers purchase bottled oil during 
festivals and celebratory occasions to treat their guests. In some middle- 
income communities (e.g., FGD in Dhaka), consumers indicated that 
they prefer bulk oil for daily use and bottled oil only for special occa-
sions, despite higher purchasing power. In other words, consumers 
evaluated the balance between price and quality of bulk and bottled oil 
in terms of the perceived benefits. In cases where the benefits of bottled 
oil are considered worthwhile, consumers will purchase bottled oil. 
While value chain actors report that product availability is largely 
driven by consumer demand, other factors also influence the brands and 
suppliers they work with. Retailer interviews reveal that they choose 
products to stock depending on which products are distributed to their 
area, product costs and relationship with sellers. This relationship is 
mostly with respect to packers – who may offer flexible payment terms 
(credit) as an incentive for retailers to stock their products. Also, some 
packers allow retailers to return damaged, unsold or expired products. 
Retailers can make more profit out of bulk oil than bottled oil because 
the retail price of bottled oil is fixed by the Maximum Retail Price (MRP). 
MRP is defined and inspected by the government for various products, 
including edible oil. Since retailers face this cap on their revenues from 
bottled oil, their profits depend on the wholesale prices they are able to 
negotiate with the producers, creating pressure for packers to keep 
prices low. 
Particularly in rural markets, wholesalers are influential in deciding 
from which refineries bulk oil is sourced. Each wholesaler distributes to 
6 At the time of the fieldwork, mandatory oil fortification law was under 
revision, which led to significant tension between MoInd and oil refineries. As a 
result, our initial attempt to interview refineries was rejected without 
employing snowballing approach or recruitment through personal contacts.  
7 The study received ethical approval from the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) of the Institute of Health Economics at the University of Dhaka, which 
was issued by the IRB on 19 August 2019. 
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particular areas. In Natore and Rangpur, the wholesalers we interviewed 
were the only ones in the market (i.e., they have a monopoly), unlike in 
urban areas such as Dhaka and Chittagong. In the case of bottled oil, 
multiple distributors operate in a given area. Some wholesalers and 
retailers, often large-scale ones, can attract clientele by offering credit. 
4.1.2. Nutrition awareness and signaling 
Generally, consumer awareness of vitamin A fortification in edible 
oil was low. Out of the five consumer FGDs, there was only one FGD 
where two out of six participants were aware of fortification in oil. 
Nevertheless, consumers perceived bottled oil to be higher quality than 
bulk oil. Consumers judged quality based on the color of the oil, 
“cleanliness”, the quality of cooking (i.e., how food felt hours after 
cooking) and viscosity, but not whether oil contained vitamin A. 
Signaling of credence characteristics is currently weak. Although 
consumers are largely unaware of fortification, they expressed general 
distrust of information on product labels. In particular, perceived in-
cidences of mislabeling were cited such as palm oil being sold as soy. 
Currently there is no clear labeling of bulk oil. As a result, consumers do 
not receive any signaling in relation to fortification status of oil. It also 
means that the origin of bulk oil is not traceable. 
4.2. Supply-side factors 
4.2.1. Value creation, capture and distribution 
While we were unable to retrieve exact cost figures from firms, we 
estimated profits from selling bottled or bulk oils for refineries based on 
interviews with chemists working in the edible oil industry as below 
(Table 3). Assuming that refineries appropriately fortify both bottled 
and bulk oils, and premix from BASF costs BDT 15,000 per kg, a refinery 
could make 34–38% further profit per liter of bottled oil and 57–75% 
more profit per liter of bulk oil if the oil is not fortified. While these 
figures should be taken with caution, Table 3 highlights the relatively 
higher benefits of under-fortifying bulk oil and challenge the view that 
fortification cost is negligible for producers (Chaudhry, 2018). 
Packers face stiff competition in the bottled oil market, both against 
each other, and with respect to the large refineries. Refineries 
acknowledge that packers can penetrate markets that are often out of 
reach for refineries, particularly in rural areas. However, refineries are 
trying to advance into these markets, thereby increasing competition in 
places where the competition among packers is already fierce. This 
creates pressure for packers to keep their prices and therefore costs low. 
Moreover, as packers only undertake packaging and distribution activ-
ities, their costs and margins are sensitive to a limited set of activities. 
Although the oil that packers purchase from refineries should already be 
fortified, packers are required to test and where vitamin A content is 
below the legal requirement, they are expected to fortify the oil before 
packaging it. 
Regarding premix sourcing, BASF only sells premix in large volumes 
of 5 or 6 L. While refineries can purchase the required quantity at once, 
packers turn to a sales agent who sells premix in smaller quantities, 
usually 0.5 L. As a result, packers turn to Grade B premix which is 
cheaper and allegedly less stable than BASF premix (see footnote 5). Due 
to the competitive pressures discussed above, the minimum purchase 
volume stipulated by BASF and the lack of sufficient knowledge amongst 
packers regarding the suitability of alternative premix sources, packers 
use this Grade B premix. 
4.2.2. Value chain coordination and managing risks of investing in 
fortification 
We identified no mechanisms to offset or share the costs of investing 
in the supply of fortified oil. Regarding QA/QC, refineries have their 
own full-time chemists to check fortification level. Packers indicated 
that they contract external chemists or equipment to check fortification 
levels. These chemists work with multiple packers. Packers also noted 
challenges associated with the productivity of in-house laboratory fa-
cilities. For instance, one packer expressed that their current equipment 
is slow at detecting fortification levels. Some packers do not actively 
check the fortification level, as they say that bulk oil coming from re-
fineries should be fortified properly. 
Moreover, value chain coordination is ineffective in signaling which 
products are appropriately fortified or not. Most wholesalers and re-
tailers accept that the products they receive are fortified “to some 
extent” but some express doubts about these claims. 
Table 1 
Geographical distribution of interviews and FDGs per stakeholder group.  
Region Actor* Chittagong Dhaka Narayanganj Gazipur Natore Rangpur Sylhet 
Premix suppliers (N = 1) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Packers (N = 38) 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 
Refineries (N = 28) 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Wholesalers 2 1 0 0 2 1 0 
Retailers 3 1 0 0 1 2 0 
Consumer FGD 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 
Key informants 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
*: N shows the total number of premix suppliers, refineries and packers based on our scoping study. There are 28 refineries across a total of 25 enterprise groups. We are 
unable to identify how many businesses exist in other stakeholder groups. 
Table 2 




Soybean Soybean Super 
palm 
Palm 
Dhaka Middle-income 95–102 90 85 NA 
Natore Rural low-income 95–105 85 65 60 
Chittagong Rural middle-income 88–110 NA* NA* NA* 
Chittagong Rural low-income 88–110 85–90 85–90 85–90 
Rangpur Middle-income 95–105 83–85 65 NA 
*Middle-income consumers in Chittagong said that they do not purchase bulk 
oil. 
Table 3 
Cost, revenue and profit for refineries and packers (BDT per liter).  
Details Refineries Packers 
Bottled oil Bulk Oil Bottled oil 
Revenue per liter of oil BDT 90 BDT 75 BDT 85 
Gross profit* BDT 6 to 7 BDT 5 to 6 BDT 4 to 5 
Operating (net) profit** BDT 2 to 2.5 BDT 1 to 1.5 BDT 1.5 to 2 
Operating profit for non- 
fortified oil 
BDT 2.75 to 
3.35 
BDT 1.75 to 
2.35 
BDT 2.25 to 
2.85 
Additional profit for non- 
fortified oil (%) 
34–38% 57–75% 43–50% 
*Revenue minus cost of producing fortified oil. 
** Gross profit minus operational and administration costs. 
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4.2.3. Institutional environment influencing value chain coordination and 
governance 
Tensions exist between the government and the association of re-
fineries, the Bangladesh Vegetable Oil Refinery Association (BVORA), 
with regards to the effort to mandate oil fortification in the country (Kar, 
2018). The law mandating oil fortification was enacted in 2010 by 
MoInd with support from the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition 
(GAIN) and UNICEF (GAIN, 2019). However, BVORA resisted this 
initiative, which resulted in a delay in implementation of the legislation 
until 2015 (Kar, 2018). 
In terms of monitoring and enforcing the oil fortification law, BSTI 
within the MoInd is the nodal agency for regulatory enforcement and 
monitoring. According to key informant interviews, BSTI conduct in-
spections of both refineries and packers, and these are expected to take 
place twice a year, once at production level where sites are visited and 
samples collected, and once at retail level. 
At production level, inspections include the conditions of the pre-
mises and equipment, capability of personnel, the adequacy of internal 
quality control measures and equipment, and sampling of products. At 
the retail and market level, BSTI collects samples of bottled edible oil 
and tests fortification quality. Where under-fortified bottled oil is 
detected at retail level, it is traced back to the producers, and can result 
in reputational damage, as well as more formal penalties. In the case of 
bulk oil, however, a lack of labelling means that inadequately fortified 
bulk oil found in the market cannot be traced to the refinery that pro-
duced it. 
Where producers are found to be in violation of the regulation, they 
are issued a warning and asked to submit a letter explaining why they 
failed to meet the standard in that instance. They are expected to carry 
out corrective actions, and if not, their license can be cancelled by BSTI. 
Fines may also be applied: ranging from BDT 50,000 (USD 575) for the 
first offence to BDT 200,000 (USD 2,300) for subsequent offences, which 
may be accompanied by imprisonment for terms ranging from six 
months to five years. One key informant argued that the level of fine 
imposed is too low for the refineries to motivate compliance. 
5. Policy implications 
We now synthesize the findings presented above to highlight the key 
obstacles to successful fortification of edible oil in Bangladesh. We also 
draw generalized lessons for improving private sector compliance to 
LSFF regulations in LMICs. 
The first challenge is the persistent demand for under-fortified food. 
Our data shows that even middle-income consumers with higher pur-
chasing power commonly choose bulk oil, implying that the added 
benefits of bottled, i.e., fortified, oil do not warrant the higher price on a 
regular basis. Fortification status of food items is invisible to consumers 
(Laviolette, 2018). As a result, consumer awareness regarding nutri-
tional value of fortified food is low. There is little incentive for producers 
to supply appropriately fortified products or for other market actors to 
be concerned with the fortification level of the product they distribute 
and sell. As consumers do not consider fortification status in purchasing 
decisions, there is also little incentive to improve information sharing or 
otherwise resolve this issue within the value chain. 
The second challenge is reflected in disincentives for large-scale 
producers, i.e., refineries, to fortify despite their ability to do so. 
While Chaudhry (2018) suggests that the cost of fortification is negli-
gible for large-scale producers, our analysis indicates that saving the cost 
of premix allows them to increase profit particularly for bulk products. 
Moreover, even if sub-standard oil is detected in the market, bulk oil 
cannot be traced to specific producers due to lack of labeling, meaning 
producers receive no sanction. The only penalty is through reputational 
damage if their bottled oil fails to meet legal fortification requirements. 
This explains why traceable products are better fortified than bulk items. 
The third challenge is reflected in the economic constraints facing 
small-scale producers, i.e., packers, who supply edible oil in rural areas 
for marginal communities. Unlike refineries, packers undertake fewer 
activities through which they can generate a margin or where they can 
seek cost efficiencies. As they face substantial competition from other 
packers and refineries, packers’ margins are squeezed. Another source of 
pressure might have been from providing credit to gain a loyal customer 
base amongst retailers, constraining their cash flow, as described in 
Randall and Anjum (2014). These economic pressures incentivize 
packers to use low-quality premix. In addition, given the significant 
variation in price and quality of premix available through third-party 
vendors in the wholesale markets in Bangladesh, it is also difficult for 
packers to adequately assess quality and ensure they pay an appropriate 
price (Garrett et al., 2015). 
The fourth challenge is inconsistent law enforcement. Effective 
enforcement is key to compliance, which requires consistent inspection 
and enforcement conducted as close to production sites as possible 
(Luthringer et al., 2015; van den Wijngaart et al., 2013). However, the 
current regulation requires both large- and small-scale producers to 
fortify, leading to confusion and increased costs by small-scale pro-
ducers. Moreover, while BSTI inspects bottled oil, the fortification status 
of bulk oil in the market is currently not monitored. BSTI does inspect 
refineries at the production level, where problems with fortification 
should be identified. However, the persistence of under-fortified bulk oil 
suggests that these measures have been ineffective. Given that the 
introduction of LSFF was strongly resisted by BVORA (Kar, 2018), BSTI 
may also be subject to political risks and pressure from the producer 
association (Luthringer et al., 2015). 
To improve the fortification status of edible oil products, Indonesia 
(Jus’at and Soekirman, 2019) and Pakistan (Randall and Anjum, 2014) 
banned the retail sale of bulk oil. However, our analysis indicates that 
such a policy change would lead to several challenges. First, this does 
not effectively address the fortification of bulk oil purchased and 
packaged by small-scale producers. As large-scale producers supply 
them with bulk oil, one could argue that the responsibility to fortify bulk 
oil is of refineries. While small-scale producers could be required to bear 
the full responsibility for fortification, they will face challenges to keep 
cost low, procure adequate premix and to test the fortification status of 
bulk oil they procure. Secondly, it could jeopardize availability or 
affordability of edible oil for marginalized communities. Therefore, such 
a policy instrument would likely be unpopular with consumers, who 
prioritize affordability. 
Our findings suggest that a preferred alternative would be to better 
enforce fortification of bulk oil at refinery level. As bulk oil is exclusively 
produced by them and is the main input for the bottled oil produced by 
packers, it would reaffirm refineries’ primary role and responsibility for 
fortification (Bishai and Nalubola, 2002; Luthringer et al., 2015) and 
remove this responsibility from packers who are less able to adequately 
fortify. It would also enable the government to focus enforcement efforts 
on the smaller number of large-scale producers and makes it unnec-
essary to improve consumer awareness. 
Enforcement can focus on low-cost strategies such as correlating the 
amount of premix used by producers to the amount of fortified food said 
to be produced (GAIN and PHC, 2018; Luthringer et al., 2015; Mbuya 
et al., 2020). Such data is currently submitted to BSTI by refineries, but 
is not being verified. Also, all fortified products, including bulk items, 
should be traceable through appropriate labelling in order to act as a 
final validation/check on fortification. Penalty needs to be sufficiently 
impactful where infringements are detected. 
Better enforcement may still be affected by political risks, which are 
likely to require new approaches. It may include stronger information 
and communication efforts involving a consistent dialogue between 
large-scale actors and regulatory authorities. Dialogue can support re-
fineries to become more comfortable with the requirements, to gain trust 
and confidence in the regulatory process, and to develop a more positive 
attitude concerning the importance of fortified bulk oil (Luthringer 
et al., 2015; Mbuya et al., 2020; Soekirman et al., 2012). These measures 
would require sufficient regulatory agency resources and capacity to 
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ensure they are effective. 
Together, these efforts would significantly improve fortification 
outcomes with respect to bulk items. If these improvements were to be 
achieved, they would in turn improve the likelihood that the bulk items 
purchased and bottled by small-scale producers would be already 
adequately fortified. In addition, small-scale producers would benefit 
from support to perform adequate quality control on the oil they pur-
chase and to procure suitable quality premix where necessary. For 
example, the government and its partners could facilitate the develop-
ment of central or collective purchasing, storage and on-sale, as well as 
common testing to optimize premix acquisition and quality control 
(Mkambula et al., 2020). 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyze mechanisms in which for-profit actors 
comply with large-scale food fortification programs aiming at improving 
micronutrient deficiency based on a case study of the edible oil sector in 
Bangladesh. While our research is timely for Bangladesh where the 
mandatory oil fortification regulation is currently under review, it also 
provides other governments in low- and middle-income contexts who 
aim to improve nutritional outcomes of marginalized population. We 
elicit factors influencing value chain actors’ decisions whether or not to 
comply with the fortification law, and by how much. We situated our 
analysis in the framework by Maestre et al. (2017). Their framework is 
designed to assess the effectiveness of agri-food value chains at 
improving the nutrition intake of vulnerable groups, and to the best of 
our knowledge, our study is the first to apply this framework system-
atically to an empirical context. 
Our analysis identified several key bottlenecks for LSFF programs in 
LMICs. First, under-fortified products are popular in the market, dis-
incentivizing value chain actors from supplying fortified products. Sec-
ond, the lack of traceability for bulk items discourages large-scale 
producers to comply with the regulation. Third, small-scale producers 
face cost pressures that prevent them from adequately fortifying oil 
products. Lastly, law enforcement is currently insufficient to prevent 
large-scale producers from supplying under-fortified bulk items in the 
market. Given these constraints, we recommend that policy makers 
strengthen the control of bulk item fortification through stronger 
engagement with large-scale producers. This approach will reaffirm the 
responsibility of large-scale producers to fortify oil thoroughly and 
thereby allow the government to control a smaller number of large-scale 
producers. This will ensure that marginalized consumers remain able to 
access affordable oil products without improving consumer awareness. 
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